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Who Regulates the Disposal of Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Under the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The present existence of immense quantities of low-level nuclear
waste,1 a federal law providing for state or regional control of such
waste disposal,2 and a number of state disposal laws challenged on a
variety of constitutional grounds3 underscore what currently may be
the most serious problem in nuclear waste disposal: who is to regulate
the disposal of low-level nuclear wastes. This problem's origin may be
traced to crucial omissions in the Atomic Energy Act of 19464 and its
1954 amendments (AEA)5 that concern radioactive waste disposal.6
Although the AEA states that nuclear materials and facilities are affected with the public interest and should be regulated to provide for
the public health and safety,7 the statute fails to prescribe specific
guidelines for any nuclear waste disposal. Indeed, more than thirty
years after passage of the AEA, the Senate Committee on Energy and
1

Low-level waste includes industrial sludges, resins, liquids, contaminated protective clothing, tools and instruments from nuclear power plants, factories, hospitals, and universities. 42
U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982).
2
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)-(d) (1982)).
3
California denies certification of new reactors until the federal government finds and approves a demonstrated technology or means of high-level nuclear waste disposal (Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§
2500-2598 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)); Illinois prohibits transportation into or storage within
Illinois of spent fuel rods used in any power generating facility located outside the state (Spent
Fuel Act, I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 111.5 para. 230.21-42 (Supp. 1981)); Montana prohibits the disposal of radioactive material in Montana no matter where generated (MONT. CODE ANN., § 75-3103(1) (1981)); New Hampshire prohibits the storage or disposal of radioactive waste within
New Hampshire or its coastal jurisdiction (Act of June 23, 1979, ch. 350, 1979 N.H. LAWS 400);
Washington sought to prohibit transportation into and storage within Washington of non-medical radioactive waste generated outside of Washington (1981 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. Chapter 1, §§
3, 4 (West)).
4
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20112284 (1982)).
8
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2011-2284 (1982)).
8
Radioactive wastes include low-level waste (see supra note 1) and high level wastes, i.e.,
those generated in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel and others so classified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 10101(12) (1982); 10 C.F.R. § 61.2 (1984).
7
42 U.S.C. § 2012(d).
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Natural Resources reported that "during this time the establishment
by the Federal Government of a definitive policy for the long-term
storage or disposal of these wastes has not been granted high priority.
Meanwhile the quantities of civilian nuclear wastes have continued to
grow."8
The Senate committee also reported that there were seventy private nuclear power plants in 1980 with an additional ninety scheduled to begin production by 1990.9 At the same time, there were only
three operating low-level nuclear waste disposal sites in the country,
located at: Richland, Washington; Beatty, Nevada; and Barnwell,
South Carolina.10 Fearing that these sites would become the country's
permanent repositories, the governors of these states implored Congress for relief. Congress finally addressed the problem by passing the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA).11
The LLRWPA grants states some control over radioactive waste
disposal, an area from which they were previously excluded by the
doctrine of federal preemption.12 States may form regional compacts,
under transfer agreements with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC),13 that take over the siting and construction of waste disposal
facilities within the compact region. The LLRWPA's authorization of
regional compacts introduces a third layer of authority14 into what
was at first a relatively clear issue of federal preemption versus the
states' traditional rights.
Almost simultaneously with Congress' passage of the LLRWPA,
many states began passing their own laws regulating the disposal and
transportation of wastes within their borders.15 Some state laws even
prohibit further construction of nuclear power plants.16 Predictably,
the nuclear industry has fought these laws in the courts.17
8

S. REP. NO. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

6933, 6934.
» Id.
10
See Dineen, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy, ENVIRONMENT, Dec. 1985, at 35.
11
42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d).
12
Id.
18
The government's regulatory arm under the Acts of 1946 and 1954 was the Atomic Energy
Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2031. The Atomic Energy Commission was replaced by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in 1974. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88
Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5849 (1982)).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 188-192.
18
See supra note 3.
19
See, e.g., California Nuclear Moratorium Law, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1981).
17
See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983) (plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that California's
law denying certification to new reactors was preempted by federal nuclear energy development
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This Comment will discuss the question of who regulates low-level
radioactive waste disposal facilities by examining the following: the
constitutional doctrines safeguarding federal government authority;
areas of state authority; grants of specific authority delegations under
the AEA and subsequent acts dealing with nuclear energy, especially
the LLRWPA and its amendment; and finally, potential problems
that may arise depending on whether ultimate regulatory authority is
deemed to rest with single states, regional compacts, or the federal
government.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY

A. Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause of the Constitution establishes federal law
as the supreme law of the land.18 The clause has been interpreted to
mean that to the extent that state laws conflict with federal laws,
they are preempted.19 State laws can be expressly preempted by acts
of Congress or impliedly preempted by federal statutory schemes
that demonstrate Congress' intent to occupy a particular field.20
Express preemption is the most direct form of preemption and it
generates little debate: enforcement of inconsistent state laws is prohibited in an area that Congress has chosen to regulate.21 In the absence of express preemption, courts must determine whether Congress has impliedly preempted regulation of a field.22 To do so, they
generally look for one of two sets of circumstances. One set of cirregulation); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (General Electric Co. and Southern Calif. Edison
sought a declaratory judgment that Illinois' law prohibiting transportation into or disposal
within Illinois of spent nuclear fuel rods was unconstitutional); Washington State Bldg. &
Const. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
Washington's statute banning transportation and storage within the state of radioactive waste
produced outside Washington. The court of appeals held the statute violated the supremacy
and commerce clauses).
18
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ." U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2.
19
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
20
Congressional regulatory purpose may be evidenced by an act that touches "a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
21
See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977) (Federal Meat Inspection
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1982) requires state laws to comply with federal meat labelling
requirements).
" Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
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cumstances occurs when the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive
that it appears that Congress did not intend for states to regulate in
this area.23 This is the occupation of the field principle. When a court
determines that Congress has occupied the field, there is no room for
state regulation.24 In making this determination, courts look only at
the congressional act itself.25 The other set of circumstances leads to
the conflict principle: a state law must fall if it produces a result inconsistent with a federal law26 or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."27 In determining that a state law must give way under the
conflict principle, courts look at the effect of the particular state law
on the federal regulatory scheme.
B. Commerce Clause
Congress has ultimate authority to regulate interstate commerce,28
which has been traditionally defined as anything that is in the flow of
traffic between or among states.29 State laws regulating the flow of
interstate commerce have been upheld if they serve a legitimate state
interest and are applied even-handedly.30 However, whenever a state
law obstructing the flow of interstate commerce is challenged, the
court will balance the state's putative need to regulate against the
federal government's need for uniformity.31

28

Id.
Id.
28
Id.
26
See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("federal exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility.").
27
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
28
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (see supra note 18 for text of clause). See also Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
28
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 76.
38
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978) ("it never has been
doubted that much state legislation, designed to serve legitimate state interests and applied
without discrimination against interstate commerce, does not violate the commerce clause even
though it affects commerce").
31
The balancing standard usually used is the three-prong test of Pike v. Bruce Church Inc.
397 U.S. 137 (1970) (evenhanded regulation, fulfillment of a legitimate local public purpose,
incidental effect on interstate commerce) or the two-tiered test of City of Phila. v. New Jersey
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (whether the state action is a protectionist measure discriminating against
out-of-state commerce and whether the state's reason for such treatment of foreign commerce
is justified).
24
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STATE AUTHORITY

A. Traditional Police Power Areas of State Regulation
Pursuant to their so-called police powers,32 the states have traditionally enacted legislation to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of their citizens.33 For example, states have generally been allowed to
regulate railroads and highways within the state,34 and public utility
franchises " 'may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the
State.' "3B The Supreme Court has recently designated environmental
protection as a legitimate local purpose "similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens."36
B. New Areas of State Regulation Stemming
From States' Police Powers
State regulation of nuclear power plants was recently upheld in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission37 as a valid extension of a state's
power to regulate other utilities, even though earlier case law stated
the opposite view. For example, in the 1971 case of Northern States
Power Company v. Minnesota,38 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit decided that while the AEA "does not use the
terms 'exclusive' or 'sole' in describing existing regulatory responsibilities of the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission," the tone of the
statute and its legislative history evidenced Congress' implied preemption of state regulation of nuclear plants.39
In Northern States, Northern States Power Company (Northern),
a Minnesota corporation, applied to the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency for a waste disposal permit for a plant being built under
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) guidelines. Northern received its
82

33

See, generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6, at 401-545 (1988).

See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (the police power supports ordinances unless they can be declared "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and without
substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.").
84
See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938),
allowing states to regulate the weight and width of vehicles using their roads and railways. The
regulations must accomplish public safety objectives and not be intended to benefit local economic interests. This test asks the first two questions of Pike and both questions of City of
Phila., as explained supra in note 31.
38
Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 205 (1983) (quoting Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1929) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
38
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
37
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 223.
38
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
89
447 F.2d at 1149.
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permit in May 1969, but found that the permit required the company
to meet substantially more stringent conditions regulating the level
of radioactive discharges than those imposed by the AEC. Northern
filed suit in August 1969, arguing that the AEC's authority preempted Minnesota's authority to regulate radioactive discharges from
nuclear power plants. In agreeing with Northern, the court noted that
the objectives of Congress "encourage the development, use and control of atomic energy so as to make the maximum contribution to the
general welfare and to increase the standard of living."40 The court
concluded that any state regulation of nuclear power would create an
obstacle to achieving these congressional objectives.41
In light of the Northern States holding, some states' subsequent
attempts to regulate nuclear power plants were deemed an intrusion
into the federal sphere.42 However, the states did not give up. In 1976
the California legislature tried a new approach, passing the California
Nuclear Laws.43 Although the federal government is responsible for
ensuring the safety of nuclear power, the states historically exercise
authority over generating and selling electricity.44 The California laws
avoid intruding into the federal sphere because they respond to economic concerns such as "the risk that the insufficiency of interim
storage space for spent fuel will lead to reactor shutdowns, rendering
nuclear energy an unpredictable and uneconomical adventure."45 California's nuclear laws deny certification of new reactors in California
until the federal government, pursuant to its authority to resolve the
nuclear waste problem, finds that there exists and approves "a
demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste."46
In separate cases filed in different districts, the Pacific Legal Foundation47 and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)48 challenged
40

Id. at 1153 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-12 (1982)).
Id. at 1154 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
42
See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 215 (7th Cir. 1982) (the NRC has
exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1981) ("Congress intended that the
transportation and storage of all materials which pose radiation hazards would be regulated by
the federal government except where jurisdiction was expressly ceded to the states.").
48
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25001 (West 1977). California's nuclear laws are part of the WarrenAlquist Energy Act, supra note 3.
44
See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n 461
U.S. 190, 194 (1983).
48
Id. at 196-97.
49
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981).
47
Pacific Legal Found, v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n 472 F
Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
48
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489 F.
Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
41
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California's nuclear laws. PG&E sought a declaratory judgment that
the laws were preempted by federal regulation of nuclear energy development. Pacific Legal Foundation filed a similar challenge. In both
cases, the district courts held that those aspects of the California
laws that attempted to regulate nuclear power plants were
preempted.49
In a consolidated appeal,50 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Pacific Legal Foundation
on grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing.51 The plaintiff utility
company in the Pacific Gas and Electric part of the case claimed
that Northern States was controlling,52 but the Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, finding that California's laws were based on
economic factors, a traditional area of state police powers.63 The
court held that California's laws did not obstruct the congressional
purpose of promoting atomic energy use since the AEA did not espouse development of atomic energy "at all costs."54 The court upheld California's reading of the AEA, one that allows a state to exercise its "inherent" regulatory authority to consider its own economic
and environmental objectives in deciding to accept or reject nuclear
power at all.55
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that
California's laws were based on economic rather than safety motives
and therefore within the state's sphere of authority.56 The Court held
that there was no direct conflict between federal and state law and
that California's laws did not frustrate congressional goals.57 The
message of Pacific Gas and Electric is that states may regulate certain aspects of nuclear power so long as the regulations address traditional state police powers and not the statutorily preempted area of
nuclear safety.
49
Pacific Legal Found., 472 F. Supp. at 197, 200-01; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 489 F. Supp. at
703-04.
80
Pacific Legal Found, v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 659 F.2d
903 (9th Cir. 1981).
81
Id. at 913-14.
82
Id. at 923.
83
Id. at 923-25.
64
Id. at 926.
88
Id.
56
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 212 (1983).
57
Id. at 216, 219.
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Authority

In addition to exercising their inherent police powers, states may
regulate areas specifically addressed in congressional grants of authority. The following such grants indicate that Congress intends
states to have some regulatory power over nuclear and radioactive
materials.
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1977. The FWPCA58
enables state governments, under Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) guidelines, to regulate the discharge of water pollutants, including some radioactive pollutants.59 Under the FWPCA it is unlawful to discharge pollutants into the nation's navigable waters without
a permit showing that the pollutants do not exceed certain effluent
limitations.60 The permits are issued by the Administrator of the
EPA or by a state if the state has developed a program in compliance
with the FWPCA.61 The statute also allows states to promulgate
guidelines even stricter than those of the EPA.62 However, the
FWPCA leaves intact the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)
authority over the discharge of source, by-product, and special nuclear materials.63
If source, by-product, and special nuclear materials can be considered "pollutants" under the FWPCA's definition,64 they come under
58

Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)), amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1567, 1575 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
88
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982).
80
Id. § 1311(b).
81
Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342.
82
Id. §§ 1251(b), 1370.
83
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 defines source material as: "(1) uranium, thorium, or any
other material which is determined by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of section
2091 of this title to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing
materials, in such concentrations as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to
time." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(2) (1982).
By-product material is defined as: "(1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of
producing or utilizing special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the
extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its
source material." Id. § 2014(e) (1982).
Special nuclear material is defined as: "(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or
in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2071 of this title, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include
source material." Id. § 2014(aa).
64
"The term 'pollutant' is defined by the FWPCA to include, inter alia, 'radioactive materials.' But when the Administrator of the EPA adopted regulations governing the permit program, . . . he specifically excluded source, by-product, and special nuclear materials—those
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EPA, and, therefore, state control. Whether this is the case was the
issue in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group.96 In
Train, Colorado organizations and residents (the respondents)
claimed potential harm from radioactive effluents discharged from
two Colorado-based nuclear power plants.66 Although the power
plants met AEC effluent standards,67 the respondents wanted the
plants to be held to the higher EPA or state standards. Therefore,
the respondents brought suit against the EPA seeking: (1) a declaration that "pollutants" under the FWPCA included even those radioactive materials regulated under the AEA,68 and (2) an injunction requiring the EPA to regulate the discharge of all radioactive
materials.89 The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend
the FWPCA to affect the regulatory authority of the NRC as established under the AEA.70 As a result, source, by-product, and special
nuclear materials continue to be regulated by the NRC. The Court
also held, however, that the FWPCA authorizes the states to regulate
radium and accelerator-produced isotopes.71 Therefore, although the
respondents failed in their attempt to have all radioactive discharges
brought under EPA control, the Train decision underscores that the
FWPCA authorizes states to set standards for certain radioactive
wastes.
2. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. The Safe Drinking Water
Act72 establishes a joint EPA-state program of regulating contaminants, including radiological substances,73 in public water systems.
The statute was passed to control contaminant levels in tap water
and protect underground drinking water sources from contamination
resulting from improper underground injection.74 Therefore, tap
water from public water systems must meet national regulations limcovered by the AEA." Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 7-8 (1976).
85
426 U.S. 1 (1976).
88
Id. at 4.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
70
Id. at 23-25.
71
Id. at 11-12.
72
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1982).
73
Id. § 300f(6). See also H.R REP. No. 1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6454, 6469.
74

Underground injection is the injection of wastes into wells specially dug for that purpose.
When the SDWA of 1974 was passed, underground injectors included municipalities (disposing
of sewage, sludge, and other wastes), industries (injecting chemicals, by-products and wastes),
and energy production companies (disposing of brines). H.R. REP. NO. 1185, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 16, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6454, 6481.

82

JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 9

iting contaminant levels and prescribing treatment techniques.75 Private, state, and federal underground injectors must obtain permits
imposing conditions that safeguard underground drinking water
sources.76 Under the 1974 Act, states had primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems if the states' drinking water regulations were no less stringent than national regulations77 and if the
states had adopted adequate enforcement, record-keeping, and exemption procedures.78
In 1986 Congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments (Amendments).79 The Amendments set more rigorous standards for compliance, enforcement, and groundwater protection. The
states continue to have primary enforcement responsibility, but the
Amendments strengthen the EPA's ability to take enforcement action when states have failed to do so.80 Under both the Act and the
Amendments, suspected violations are reported to the states, who in
turn report them to the EPA. If the EPA "finds"81 a violation, it notifies the state and the violator.82 Under the Act, if the state has not
begun enforcement action within thirty days of notification, the Administrator "may" commence such action.83 Under the Amendments,
however, the Administrator "shall" commence an enforcement action.84 This language indicates that Congress wants the EPA to be
able to initiate more enforcement actions. One effect of the change
could be that states, to preserve their enforcement autonomy, will
more aggressively carry out their delegated enforcement duties.
A new program established under the Amendments strengthens the
states' regulatory role. The state Wellhead Protection Program authorizes states to determine whether they need a wellhead protection
program and which wellhead areas should be protected from contamination.85 Significantly, federal agencies with jurisdiction over contaminant sources with potential to pollute a state's designated wellhead protection area are subject to the state's program
78
76
77
78
78
90
81
82
83
84
85

42 U.S.C. § 300f(l).
Id. See also H.R. REP. NO. 1185, supra note 74.
42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)(l).
Id. § 300g-2(a)(2), (3), (4).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-ll (West Supp. 1987).
Id. §§ 300g-3(a).
Id. §§ 300g-3(a), (g).
Id. §§ 300g-3(a), 300h-2(a).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(a)(l)(A)-(B), 300h-2(a)(2) (1982).
42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(l)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 300h-7(e).
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requirements.86
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The Northern States
court asserted that Congress had impliedly preempted state regulation of nuclear power plants.87 However, the Clean Air Act (CAA) of
197088 provided that all federal facilities "shall comply with federal,
state, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent any person is subject to such
requirements."89 The CAA espoused the principle that "[e]ach State
shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within
the entire geographic area comprising such state."90 Kentucky interpreted this language to mean that it could require federal installations on state land to secure operating permits as required by its federally approved clean air implementation plan. In the ensuing case of
Hancock v. Train,91 the Court rejected this view. It held that because
the CAA did not, with "satisfactory clarity," evince intent to subject
federal installations to state permit requirements, such an interpretation could not be mandated by the Court.92
Congress overruled Northern States and answered the Hancock
decision by passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.93 These
amendments grant states, not the federal government, regulatory authority over commercial nuclear facilities and materials. Once states'
procedures are approved by the EPA, the states control the radioactive air pollutants of commercial nuclear facilities.94
In summary, the Safe Drinking Water Act95 establishes joint EPAstate regulation, while the Federal Water Pollution Control Act96 and
the Clean Air Act Amendments provide for state authority once the
state scheme garners EPA approval.97 These acts show that Congress
does not consider that only the federal government may regulate radiation hazards. These grants of authority establish, therefore, that
88

Id. § 300h-7(h).
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1149 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See also text accompanying note 38.
88
Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676-1713 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1982)).
88
Id. § 1857F.
80
Id. § 1857c-2(a).
91
426 U.S. 167 (1976).
92
Id. at 198. The Court did not preclude the possibility, however, that federal installations
could be subject to state permit requirements, stating "[s]hould this nevertheless be the desire
of Congress, it need only amend the Act to make its intention manifest." Id.
93
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)).
94
Id. § 7412(d)(1).
88
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-ll (West Supp. 1987).
86
See supra note 58.
87
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
87
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the states, subject to EPA guidelines, may regulate various radioactive wastes and air pollutants.
IV.

REGIONAL COMPACTS

The LLRWPA authorizes the states to form regional compacts to
develop disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste.98 Because these
regional compacts are interstate compacts, they are governed by the
compact clause99 of the Constitution. "[Interstate agreements
presenting even potential encroachments on federal supremacy"100
are conditioned upon congressional approval under the compact
clause. Individual states agree or contract101 to form compacts. Since
it is a contract, a compact "may not be amended, modified, or otherwise altered without the consent of all parties."102 A state may not
pass legislation that alters either its responsibilities within the compact or the compact's goals, nor may it withdraw unilaterally from a
compact.103 Further, once a compact is approved by Congress, it becomes federal law. Various cases that construe compact law imply
that once states enter into compacts, the states are subordinate to
the compact.104
It is unclear to what degree a compact can be modified after it is
formed. If all signatories agree to the modification, it should be permissible.105 Individual states apparently must abide by the terms as
initially set out if they cannot persuade all signatories to agree to the
changes. Even Congress' ability to make modifications in a compact
it has approved is unclear. In 1855 the Supreme Court held that Congress' commerce clause power took precedence over its compact
clause power, suggesting that Congress could exercise its authority to
regulate commerce regardless of existing compacts.106 Over a century
88

42 U.S.C. § 2021b-2021d (1982).
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 10, cl. 3.
IOO "[T]he terms compact and contract are synonymous." Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
1, 92 (1823).
"" Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
102
CT. Hellmuth & Assoc, v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 408, 409 (D.
Md. 1976). See also Kansas City Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1981) ("One
party to an interstate compact may not enact legislation which would impose burdens upon the
compact absent the concurrence of other signatories.") Id. at 174.
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Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 92-93.
104
See, e.g„ Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1981);
Rao v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 122 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.
1955); Intake Water v. Board of Natural Resource & Conservation, 197 Mont. 482, 645 P.2d
383, 386 (1982).
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later, however, the Second Circuit refused to hold that Congress has
"the implied constitutional power to alter, amend or repeal its consent to an interstate compact."107
V.

REGULATORY AUTHORITY UNDER THE AEA AND SUBSEQUENT
RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY ACTS

A. Atomic Energy Act
Congress passed the first Atomic Energy Act in 1946 (the 1946
Act),108 "when atomic energy was popularly associated only with the
atom bomb."109 The 1946 Act allowed private industry to conduct research and build commercial reactors under license from the AEC,110
the government's regulatory arm,111 but it made "the manufacture
and use of atomic materials a Government monopoly."112 In 1954,
when the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)113 replaced the 1946 Act,
the civilian role was broadened: the statute encouraged "widespread
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of the public."114 The AEA was amended again in 1959 to establish a regulatory
role for the states:115 they may agree to be responsible for the disposal of nuclear waste.116 The balance between federal and state power
in this area, however, is anything but clear. Since the AEA merely
states purposes and does not codify the regulatory roles of states or
of the federal government,117 it would appear that Congress intended
the courts to determine the scope of federal preemption.
The federal government, through the Nuclear Regulatory Commis107

Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962)
(Congress' express reservation of rights to alter, amend, or repeal its consent to a compact is
predicated on whether Congress has such power under the Constitution. Since this power is not
expressly given to Congress by the Constitution, if it exists at all, it must exist as an implied
power).
108
Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2022-2284 (1982)).
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S. R. REP. NO. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS 3456, 3457.
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See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(f), (p), 2131-34 (1982).
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See id. § 2251 (1982).
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1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3456, 3458.

42 §§ 2011-2281 (1982).
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Id. § 2013(d).
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Id. § 2021.
1,8
Id. § 2021(a)(4).
117
Id. § 2021. See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1156 (8th
Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). ("Congress knew how to establish federal preemption by expressly providing therefor in clear language. No such language was incorporated into
the Act").
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sion (NRC),118 licenses nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities119 and regulates potential radiation
hazards.120 Generally, states may regulate nuclear activities of AEA
licensed facilities within their borders in the areas of "health, safety,
and economic purposes other than radiation protection."121 Radiological safety, though, remains the federal government's province
through regulation of "the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility."122 However, the states may sometimes
regulate radiation protection by entering into agreements with the
NRC that provide for state regulation of by-product materials, source
materials, and, in certain circumstances, special nuclear materials,
i.e., low-level nuclear wastes.123 In short, Congress regulates the
safety hazards of high level nuclear energy, and the states, subject to
NRC approval and regulation, may agree to be responsible for other
aspects of nuclear power, including radiological safety hazards. Thus,
a potential exists for dual regulation in the safety area, with resulting
federal-state conflicts. Because of this, the courts will probably
strictly review state legislation that concerns radiological safety. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Gas and Electric considered
California's nuclear laws to be constitutional not because they were
passed under a valid grant of authority from the federal government,124 but because the court found an economic purpose for the
legislation along with the safety purpose.125
B. Radioactive Waste Policy Acts
1. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA).
The LLRWPA expresses two Congressional policies: (1) states are responsible for disposing of low-level radioactive waste generated
within their borders,126 and (2) states can most effectively and safely
dispose of low-level nuclear waste on a regional basis.127
In stating that "[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing, ei118

See supra note 13.
42 U.S.C. § 2241.
120
Id. § 2021(c).
121
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Id. § 2021(c).
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Id. § 2021(k).
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Id. § 2021(d).
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Pacific Legal Found, v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d
903, 923-25 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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ther by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal"128
of low-level wastes, Congress has expressly granted states authority
to regulate low-level nuclear waste disposal. Unlike the situation
where the AEA, through the NRC, delegated to states the authority
to regulate some radiological safety hazards, or the situation in Pacific Gas and Electric where the Court found a permissible economic
motive for state regulation, the LLRWPA requires each state to dispose of its nuclear waste. Congress has given up its right to be the
exclusive regulator in this area.
The statute emphasizes the state as a distinct entity—"each State"
is responsible "either by itself or in cooperation" with other states.129
However, the second policy of the LLRWPA is that the states should
work together in nuclear waste disposal. These responsibilities belong
to the states and may be best met by the states working together in
regional compacts.
To encourage states to form regional compacts as quickly as possible, Congress established July 1, 1986, as the deadline by which a
state either had to have joined a compact or passed legislation to deal
with its own wastes.130 After Congress approved a compact, the regional disposal site would be allowed, beginning January 1, 1986, to
refuse to accept waste produced outside the region.131
2. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendment of
1985.132 Various problems and delays in implementing the LLRWPA
led to compromise legislation aimed at keeping the existing low-level
sites open while other regional facilities could be developed.133 Under
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendment of 1985,
compacts must submit plans for disposal facilities by January 1,
1988, and must submit license applications to the NRC by January 1,
1993.134 During this process, states that do not belong to compacts
must limit the amounts of radioactive material they send to the existing sites.135 The out-of-region surcharge they must pay will double
within the first six months of the 1988 deadline's one year grace pe128

Id. § 2021c(a)(l) (Supp. Ill 1985).
Id.
138
Id. § 2021d(c).
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Id.
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42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021b-2021j (West Supp. 1987).
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Many states were reluctant to join in compacts, states claimed disposal facilities couldn't
be ready before the 1990s. See Dineen, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy, ENVIRONMENT,
Dec. 1985, at 35.
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riod and will quadruple during the second six months.138
VI.

AUTHORITY UNDER THE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
ACT AND ITS AMENDMENT

A. Federal or State Authority?
The LLRWPA expressly delegates authority to states to site, build,
and manage low-level nuclear waste repositories. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, interpreted the 1980
Act very narrowly in Washington State Building and Construction
Trade Council v. Spellman.137
In November 1980, Washington State voters enacted Initiative 383,
which prohibited the "transportation and storage within Washington
of radioactive waste produced outside the state" 138 and provided for
the formation of regional waste disposal compacts. Since 1964 the
State of Washington has leased a 1,000 acre area of the Hanford Reservation in Washington from the federal government, subleasing a
part of that land as a commercial low-level radioactive waste
dump.139 This is the Richland site, one of only three operating radioactive waste repositories in the country.140 The site receives approximately forty percent of the nation's low-level nuclear waste, approximately ninety-five percent of which originates outside of
Washington.141 Washington monitors both the site and the shipments
of waste sent to it.142
Initiative 383 was attacked by the Richland site's operator and
seven other plaintiffs, who sought a declaration that it was unconstitutional. The United States filed a separate similar action. Both the
site users and the government claimed that the initiative violated the
commerce clause and that the AEA and the LLRWPA preempted
state authority. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington granted the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion,143
striking down Initiative 383 as unconstitutional. The State of Washington appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.144 It found that Wash,38

Id. § 2021e(d)(l).
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ington's purpose in passing the initiative was to exercise its police
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens145 and concluded
that this is an illegal purpose under the AEA, which reserves safety
regulation of nuclear power to the federal government.146
The court also examined the LLRWPA provision that permits
states to form regional compacts. It agreed that "[b]ecause Congress
specifically gives permission for regional disposal in this Act," states
signatory to a compact could exclude waste from non-signatory states
without violating the supremacy or commerce clauses.147 However,
the court concluded that since at the time of the initiative Washington had not formed an interstate compact, it could not legally exclude out-of-state wastes.148 The court apparently relied on the
LLRWPA section dealing with regional compacts that states that restrictions on use of regional disposal sites by out-of-region producers
shall not be effective until January 1, 1986, and until Congress has
consented to the compact.149
The Ninth Circuit also relied on a traditional commerce clause
analysis to invalidate Washington's initiative. Citing the criteria of
Pike v. Bruce Church,160 the court held that the initiative failed all
three parts of the Pike test.151 The test considers that "[w]here the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."152 According to the Ninth Circuit, the Washington initiative failed the first
part of the Pike test, which requires that a state law regulate evenhandedly, because the initiative banned only out-of-state waste.153
The initiative failed the second part of the test, that a state law accomplish a legitimate local public purpose, by failing to address "the
manner in which local waste, (sic) transported and stored within
Washington has superior safety and environmental virtues over waste
produced elsewhere . . . ,"154 Finally, the Washington law failed the
third part of the Pike test, that a state law should have only an inci148
146
147
148
148
180
181
182
183
184

Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 630.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c).
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631.
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dental effect on interstate commerce, because Washington receives
forty percent of the country's low-level nuclear waste.156
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Spellman mirrors the rationale of
Northern States.169 In both cases the court concluded that the AEA
evidences Congress' implied preemption of state nuclear power regulation. In Spellman the court found that Washington's exercise of its
police power was an illegal purpose under the AEA. However, this is
not a reason to invalidate the Washington initiative, since the AEA
expresses federal preemption of high level waste regulation, not that
involving low-level wastes. On the other hand, the LLRWPA delegates full responsibility to states to control disposal of low-level nuclear wastes generated within their borders regardless of purposes.
The Spellman court also found that Washington could not exclude
out-of-state wastes because it had not yet joined a regional compact
at the time the initiative was passed.157 However, contrary to the
court's assumption, Washington was not acting in any compact capacity when it closed its borders to out-of-state wastes. It was acting
to fulfill the other mandate of the statute, that states control disposal
of low-level wastes generated within their borders. Although the compact section is permissive ("States may enter into such compacts"),158
the responsibility section is mandatory ("Each State shall be responsible").159 The court could have interpreted Washington's closing of
its dump to out-of-state wastes as a way of upholding the responsibility section. Pursuant to the LLRWPA's mandate, Washington preserved space in the dump for locally-produced wastes and encouraged, even forced, other states to accept responsibility for their
own wastes. Instead, the court confused the statute's requirements in
two respects. First, it insisted that Washington abide by the 1986
deadline when that deadline is only relevant if a state decides to
enter a compact. Second, it overlooked the fact that the statute requires states immediately to assume responsibility for disposal of
their low-level wastes.
Finally, the court erred in using a commerce clause analysis to invalidate the Washington initiative. Such a traditional analysis is unwarranted where, as here, a federal statute mandates state activity.
Although the court believed that the initiative failed the first part of
188
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2d 1143 (1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See text accompanying note 38.
Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630.
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the Pike test,160 the LLRWPA requires that a state be responsible for
disposing of its own wastes.161 Furthermore, the LLRWPA's legislative history reveals that the statute addresses an underlying problem
of great magnitude. Senators Strom Thurmond and Ernest Hollings,
who introduced the LLRWPA as a bill, explicitly stated Congress'
mood and purpose in passing the legislation. Senator Thurmond
declared:
It is extremely unfair to allow three states to become the "dumping
grounds" for waste which all 50 states generate. If other states are to
share in the benefits of nuclear power production and nuclear
medicine, they must begin to share in the responsibilities which include the unpleasant task of waste disposal.162
Perhaps the most effective way to force other states to share in waste
disposal responsibilities is to deny them access to existing facilities.
Washington fulfilled the congressional mandate set forth in the
LLRWPA by regulating its own nuclear waste and excluding out-ofstate waste. If this burdens interstate commerce, it is allowed under
the statute.
Further, Washington's action has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce. The Washington initiative bans the "importation
and storage of nonmedical radioactive wastes generated outside
Washington, unless permitted by interstate compact (emphasis
added)."163 Since Governor Spellman campaigned on the basis of negotiating a regional compact,184 and since Initiative 383 authorized
the state to enter into such compacts, subject to state and congressional approval,165 it was probable that Washington would soon form
a regional compact maintaining Richland as the first disposal site.
This in turn would mean that Washington's ban would be lifted as to
the other member states. Thus, the court could have found that the
ban was more likely than not to be temporary, making the effect on
interstate commerce only incidental.
The Ninth Circuit's commerce clause rationale, as used to invalidate Washington's initiative, contradicts Congress' express intention
to delegate control of low-level waste disposal to the states because it
applies the Pike test to a situation that Congress seems to have intended to remove from that type of scrutiny. Since Spellman was the
180
181
182
183
184
188

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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first case construing the LLRWPA, it may have inhibited other states
from aggressively seeking to comply with the statute by forming regional compacts. In fact, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendment Act of 1985 was passed to expedite matters of compact
formation.
B. State or Compact Authority?
1. Compact Option. The LLRWPA allows states to form regional
compacts as necessary to carry out their responsibilities in disposing
of their nuclear wastes. The Act's legislative history reveals that Congress considered regional compacts to be the most efficient way to
handle the problem.188 Congress assumed that states would form six
or eight regional compacts167 and that states without facilities would
join with states that had facilities with "the idea of eventually establishing an efficient, safe system of regional disposal sites."168
2. Single State Option. While Congress envisioned regional compacts as the principal way of dealing with the low-level nuclear waste
disposal problem, no state is forced to participate in a compact. The
main incentive for states to form compacts is that the compact group
is expected to accept waste only from within its region.169 What happens to a state that does not join a compact? A single state may build
a facility or may license a commercial facility to dispose of the state's
own low-level nuclear waste, but the LLRWPA does not grant the
state permission to refuse to accept such wastes generated in other
states. Only groups of states that have formed compacts have that
option. In fact, the Spellman court stressed that only "states signatory to a compact could exclude waste from nonsignatory states without violating the Supremacy or Commerce Clause."170 If a state cannot restrict access to its dump to only those wastes generated within
its borders, no incentive exists to develop a disposal facility. Yet not
all states can or should join in a regional compact,171 and no state is
required to do so.
188

126 CONG. REC. 20,136 (1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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The sensible resolution is to allow a single state option in which a
particular state could receive congressional approval to be considered
a region. It would then be able to dispose of its own waste without
being required to accept wastes from other states. Senators Thurmond and Hollings said that states should either dispose of their own
waste or arrange with other states willing to accept the waste.172 The
incentive needed for a state to proceed with its own disposal is the
exclusionary protection granted to regional compacts. Allowing a single state to be considered a region similar to a compact region provides that incentive. The majority of states will probably still form
into regional compacts, but states with special circumstances, concerning, for example, quantities of waste produced or geographical
isolation, need the flexibility that the single state option allows. Despite the Spellman holding, the single state option comports with the
LLRWPA's intent and with its language.
Granting compact status to single states is also consistent with the
market participant exception to the commerce clause. A state that
enters the market not as a regulator, but as a participant or proprietor, escapes commerce clause regulation.173 In the context of low-level
nuclear waste disposal, this means that the state would have to construct and run its own waste disposal facility and block the establishment of private commercial facilities, since these sites could accept
out-of-state wastes.174 Therefore, if a state becomes a participant in
the market, it may choose with whom it will do business. The Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, Inc.176 sustained this
concept. In a plan to rid the state of abandoned automobiles, Maryland passed a statute providing that anyone who owned a "hulk" (defined as an inoperable automobile more than eight years old) could
turn it over to a scrap processor, who would receive a bounty from
the state for each hulk it destroyed.176 Requirements for out-of-state
processors to obtain a bounty from the state of Maryland were more
complex than those for in-state processors. When a Virginia processor challenged the law because it discouraged suppliers from taking
hulks out of state for processing, the Court upheld it. Justice Powell,
172
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writing for the majority, stated that Maryland did not seek to prohibit the flow of interstate commerce; it merely entered the market as
a participant. He declared, "Nothing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others."177 In Spellman, Washington
claimed that it was acting as a market participant in refusing to accept out-of-state waste. The court rejected this argument, concluding
that Washington, in refusing entry at its borders to out-of-state
waste, was acting as a market regulator and not as a proprietor.178 To
have been considered a proprietor, Washington should have owned
and operated the Richland site itself and refused entry to out-ofstate waste at the site.
A single state that wants to be eligible for regional compact status,
therefore, must exhibit certain characteristics in its waste disposal
operations. It must own and operate its disposal site, be able to keep
commercial sites from operating within the state unless the operators
agree to restrictive terms mirroring the state facility's terms, and restrict access to the sites to waste generated within the state rather
than ban importation of all out-of-state wastes. These, according to
the Ninth Circuit, are the criteria necessary to satisfy the market
participant exception of the commerce clause.179
3. Potential Problems With Compacts.
a. The Compact Approach. Potential problems with compacts include the number of compacts formed, the way they are formed, the
status they will have after congressional approval, and whether states
can withdraw from them. Although Congress originally considered six
to eight compacts sufficient and did not want fifty sites in fifty
states,180 there are currently eight compacts,181 with more planned.182
177

Id. at 810.
Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631.
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See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
The compacts approved by Congress to date are:
Northwest: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming
(42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 221).
Central: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 222).
Southeast: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 223).
181
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As more compacts are formed, more sites must be found, approved
and built. The LLRWPA's intent is to dispose of wastes as safely and
economically as possible. A proliferation of sites works against this
goal.
Another potential problem with compacts is that it is possible for a
state to enter a compact without submitting the decision to the electorate.183 On such a highly emotional issue as nuclear waste disposal,
a state might be tempted to enter a compact through the back door,
avoiding a confrontation with voters. Voter initiatives and state laws
have shown that many people are reluctant to allow nuclear waste
storage in their states.184 However, at least one court has held that
agreements to form compacts are valid if approved by "a board, commission, or party duly authorized to do so by the legislature."185 Even
informal agreements made by public service commissions have been
found to be binding as interstate compacts.188 If a state need not seek
the consent of the full legislature, it could commit itself to a compact
without letting voters express their views.
Apart from the way they are formed, compacts create the problem
of a third layer of authority in addition to that of the federal government and the states. For example, independent states may form a
compact. Once the compact is ratified by Congress, however, it becomes an independent entity "of binding force . . . operating with
the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers."187 Some courts
have held that only the party states may contest the formation of the
Central Midwest: Illinois, Kentucky. (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 224).
Midwest: Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin. (42 U.S.C. §
2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 225.)
Rocky Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming (42 U.S.C. §
2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 226).
Northeast: New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland. (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 227.)
A ninth, yet unapproved compact is Appalachian: Pennsylvania and West Virginia. See
Prochaska, supra note 174, at 387.
182
The California legislature recently approved California's membership in a four state compact to include Arizona, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Congress has not approved this
compact yet. Carlson, Quick Name a State Willing to Accept Radioactive Waste, Wall St. J.,
June 30, 1987, at 35, col. 1.
183
See infra text accompanying note 185.
184
See Spellman, 684 F.2d 627. See supra note 3.
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General Expressways v. Iowa Reciprocity Bd., 163 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa 1968).
188
Id. See also Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 124 F.2d 800 (3d
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 313 U.S. 546 (1941). (The Third Circuit held valid as an interstate
agreement an informal agreement made by the public service commissions of Pennsylvania and
Maryland to regulate electricity.).
187
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838).
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compact.188 This essentially denies standing to any of the compact
opponents. As an independent entity, the compact may control its
member states' actions. Once approved by Congress, a compact is a
contract that "may not be amended, modified, or otherwise altered
without the consent of all parties."189 For example, in a dispute over
a New York-New Jersey compact regarding shipping regulations between the two states, a court held that legislation passed by New
York to increase the compact agency's liability would not be effective
unless New Jersey consented.190 Various similar holdings suggest that
state law can be subordinated to compact provisions.191
Another possible major problem involves state withdrawal from
compacts. Traditionally, just as a state could not unilaterally pass
legislation affecting the compact of which it was a member,192 neither
could it unilaterally withdraw from a compact.193 Yet the LLRWPA
permits a state to withdraw upon two to five years advance notification to the compact if it finds the burden of membership too great.194
A state might easily perceive its membership burden to be too great
if it is chosen as the repository host site. A certain flexibility in membership requirements is necessary to induce a state to join, but if
there is no real certainty that the burdens of disposal will be shared,
the system may not operate optimally.
Three of the approved compacts were formed around existing sites.
These are: The Northwest Compact, with the disposal site at Richland, Washington; the Rocky Mountain Compact, with facilities at
Beatty, Nevada; and the Southeast Compact, with access to the site
at Barnwell, South Carolina.195 To date no state has tried to withdraw from one of these compacts, so the withdrawal provisions remain untested. However, Utah and Wyoming belong to both the
Rocky Mountain and the Northwest compacts.196 Whether they will
send waste to one or both or will have to withdraw from one is un188
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Rao v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 122 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1955).
192
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
193
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 92-93 (1823).
194
Prochaska, supra note 174, at 394.
198
See supra note 181.
198
Id.
188

1988]

DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

97

known. Kansas and North Dakota, both currently in the Central
Compact, and Arizona in the Rocky Mountain Compact, want to
realign with California in a new compact.197 The notification, withdrawal, and realignment of these states may set the standard for
others seeking to shift membership.
b. The Single State Approach. Possible problems with the single
state option include meeting the requirements of the market participant exception, possible preemption of state radioactive waste regulation, and the expense of maintaining a facility. The market participant exception requires that the state be a proprietor.198 If a state
were not able to prohibit the operation of a commercial site within its
borders,199 it could not cut off the flow of out-of-state waste even if it
were the proprietor of a site. Unless state prohibitory laws are
drafted very carefully, they could be preempted by federal laws in
the areas of health and safety. Finally, unless a state is a large generator of low-level nuclear waste, it may find it is too expensive to develop and operate a disposal site.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Both Congress and the states realize that low-level nuclear waste
disposal presents crucial problems that must soon be solved. Although maintaining that nuclear waste safety is traditionally an area
of federal regulation, Congress has recognized that the states should
participate in waste disposal policy determinations. To this end, Congress has delegated regulatory authority to the states to dispose of
their own waste, preferably by forming regional compacts. The delegation of authority to states is an effective way to handle the problem. The compact concept may be less effective. The compact system, in creating an added layer of government, may allow states too
much leeway in deciding whether, when, and with whom to form
compacts. The biggest obstacle to the success of the compact concept
might be the LLRWPA provision that allows states to withdraw from
compacts with relative ease. The single state option, arguably legal
under the statute, is a valid alternative for only a few states.
Congress could adopt various means to ensure that the statute's
goals are achieved. One way is to establish an upper limit on the
number of compacts. Another way is to set a minimum number of
"" Id.
198
See supra note 173.
199
See supra note 173 and accompanying text. The state prohibition against commercial
facilities might be considered a restraint against trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
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states that a compact must contain. The Central Midwest Compact
was approved with only two members, Illinois and Kentucky.200 Perhaps such a small compact is a legislative indulgence. Another possibility is to put stringent limits on the single state option to ensure
that only states producing significant amounts of low-level waste can
consider it. States that produce minimal amounts of low-level waste
need not be forced to join compacts if they can arrange to buy space
in a nearby disposal facility. Not until the percentage of waste they
produce rises to a particular triggering point would they need to join
a compact.
As the 1993 deadline201 for states' low-level radioactive waste disposal plans draws near, Congress may need to consider a more forceful approach that defers less to states' preferences and more to public
safety.
DEBORAH M. MOSTAGHEL
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